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This article reviews the Finnish dose-rate mapping equipment and the system to process 
the obtained results, which were used immediately after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. We 
present the results of the external gamma-radiation monitoring carried out with simple 
civil-defence gamma monitoring instruments and compare them with the subsequent 
deposition mapping performed with research-grade instruments. The analysis shows that 
the quality of radiation mapping is good enough for decision makers to direct protective 
measures to the right areas. This review also demonstrates that a simple stationary external 
gamma radiation monitoring network can be effectively used for early warning in radiation 
emergency situations.
Introduction
The intense nuclear weapons testing in the atmos-
phere in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s 
led many countries to initiate environmental-radi-
oactivity surveillance programmes (UNSCEAR 
2000). In Finland, the arrangements for a coun-
trywide radioactivity monitoring programme 
were initiated in 1956 by the Finnish Meteorolog-
ical Office (currently the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute), the Defence Forces, the Finnish Marine 
Research Institute and the University of Helsinki 
(Mattsson 2005). In 1958, the Institute of Radia-
tion Physics (current name STUK — Radiation 
and Nuclear and Safety Authority, henceforth 
STUK) was established to study, among other 
things, the environmental behaviour and human 
health risks of artificial radioactivity (Hoffman 
2008). The first monitoring programmes began in 
Finland in the late 1950s. Radiation monitoring 
devices and procedures were developed within 
separate projects by several authorities but also as 
a result of joint efforts. Finnish manufacturers of 
monitoring devices also participated in the devel-
opment work.
In Finland, measurements of external dose 
rate have continued regularly since the early 
1960s. The countrywide radiation monitoring 
network was built by the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Defence Forces for the purpose of civil 
defence, as well as military nuclear, biologi-
cal and chemical (NBC) protection (Blomqvist 
1981). The stationary external dose rate moni-
toring network was planned to comprise about 
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500 stations: one station in every 40 ¥ 40 km2 
in northern Finland, and one station in every 20 
¥ 20 km2 in southern Finland (Blomqvist 1981). 
With this network, the fallout from the series of 
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests at Novaya 
Zemlya in 1961 and 1962 was registered. In 
1986, when the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
accident took place, over 400 stations were in 
operation. Already before the Chernobyl acci-
dent, there were plans to develop the monitoring 
network to give more accurate and more real-
time information on external radiation. In addi-
tion to this network, the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute and STUK operated a few stations for 
monitoring external dose rate.
The monitoring networks and 
instruments
In 1986, the Ministry of the Interior operated 
Finland’s largest countrywide external radiation 
monitoring network (Fig. 1). It was administered 
by the 12 state provincial offices. The monitor-
ing was carried out by e.g. municipal fire depart-
ments, the Public Roads and Waterways Board 
and civil aviation authorities at the airports. 
The Defence Forces had an external radiation 
monitoring network of its own, with some of the 
monitoring stations located at the premises of 
the Frontier Guard Authority. In 1986, altogether 
320 stations were maintained by the Ministry of 
the Interior and 85 by the Defence Forces.
The instruments used by the Ministry of the 
Interior’s stationary external gamma monitor-
ing stations were Wallac/Alnor RDA-31 (Fig. 2), 
and RDA-4 and RD-120/1200 (Fig. 3) radiation 
monitors. The two measurement ranges for these 
instruments were 0.05–400 mR h–1 and 0.05–
400 R h–1. The energy dependence for gamma 
radiation was ±20% in the photon energy range 
from 60 keV to 3 MeV. These were used to 
measure gamma radiation dose rates at a height 
of 1.5 m above the ground level. The detectors 
of the monitors consisted of two energy-compen-
sated Geiger-Müller (GM) tubes.
The accuracy of the measurements was not 
the best possible because:
1. The dose rates were below the calibrated 
range of the radiation monitors (minimum 
10 µSv h–1). For this reason, at some mon-
a b c
Fig. 1. external radiation monitoring stations operated under the ministry of the interior in 1986. (a) all 320 stations, 
(b) 60 continuously monitoring stations, and (c) 21 digital pulse register (DPr-82) stations.
Boreal env. res. vol. 18 • Dose rate mapping and analysis of radioactive deposition 63
Fig. 2. alnor rDa-31 radiation monitor.
Fig. 3. Wallac rD-1200 radiation monitor.
itoring stations pulses from the GM-tube 
were counted by an operator during a 3-min 
period. This method of data collection causes 
a systematic error, an underestimate of 30% 
(Blomqvist 1981). Only 21 of the stations 
in Finland were equipped with an automatic 
digital pulse register unit (DPR-82), which 
counted the pulses into a register during an 
hour, thus reducing this error.
2. Different GM-tubes gave slightly different 
count rates for equal dose rates at low radia-
tion levels.
3. GM tubes have an internal background 
“noise” count rate.
The estimated overall accuracy of each meas-
urement was ±50%, because the measured mag-
nitudes of dose rates were near the minimum 
detectable value. The accuracy of the stations 
equipped with a DPR-82 unit was ±10%–20% 
(Blomqvist 1988) depending on the monitor and 
location-specific differences.
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Fig. 4. on the left Wallac rD-5, in the middle rD-6 and on the right rD-7 radia-
tion monitor.
Fig. 5. Wallac rD-8 Universal 
radiation monitor.
Fig. 6. alnor rD-10 Uni-
versal radiation monitor.
For backup purposes, there was a portable 
radiation monitor at every station. If an alarm 
occurred at a monitoring station, the result was 
ensured with a portable monitor (Alnor/Wallac 
RD-6/7/8/10; Figs. 4–6). The two measure-
ment ranges of these instruments were 0.01–300 
mR h–1 and 0.01–300 R h–1. The energy depend-
ence was ±20% in the range 45 keV to 2 MeV.
All the measured values were stored in the 
database in counts per hour (cph) and converted 
to µR h–1. The conversions from cph to µR h–1 
for the Wallac RD-6 and RD-7 radiation moni-
tors were made using to the following equation 
(Blomqvist 1981):
 D = 0.265 ¥ n – 7.5 (1)
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and for the Wallac/Alnor RD-8, RD-10 and 
RDA-31 monitors, the conversions were done 
as follows (Ministry of the Interior, calibration 
test 1986):
 D = 0.78 ¥ n – 3, D < 0.1 mR h–1 (2)
 D = 0.00086 ¥ n, D ≥ 0.1 mR h–1 (3)
where n is the number of counts in units counts 
per minute (cpm) and D is the dose rate (µR h–1). 
Note that R = 0.01 Sv.
Of the 320 stations operating under the Min-
istry of the Interior, 260 stations were measur-
ing normally once a week on Tuesdays. Sixty 
stations were monitoring the dose rate continu-
ously. At 20 of these continuously monitoring 
stations, there was an auxiliary unit DPR-82 
which digitally counted the pulses from a GM-
tube and displayed the result on a digital display. 
In Rovaniemi, there was one additional station 
with a DPR-unit. This station delivered results 
directly to STUK (Blomqvist 1986). Twenty-
seven stations plotted the dose rate continuously 
on a monthly chart. Other stations recorded their 
results once a week. On a specific request from 
the Ministry of the Interior or from the state pro-
vincial office, there was a possibility to intensify 
the monitoring.
In 1986, the responses to measured external 
gamma dose rates were as follows:
• at 0.7 µSv h–1: notify radiation monitoring 
authorities;
• at 10 µSv h–1: intensify measurement inter-
vals and alert authorities;
• at 200 µSv h–1: warn the population;
• at 2 mSv h–1: commence population protec-
tion.
To minimize equipment-related false alarms, 
it was required to verify the dose rate measure-
ment with another instrument, and take into 
account the natural background dose rate, which 
in Finland varies between 0.04 and 0.3 µSv h–1 
(Mustonen 2000).
In radiation emergency situations, it was 
possible to establish 2000 additional measuring 
points and send out patrols, which used port-
able radiation monitors. In 1986, there were 
4942 universal radiation dose rate instruments in 
authority use in the Finnish municipalities (Sisä-
asiainministeriö 1989).
The monitoring network was based upon 
manual data transmission. For data processing 
of the measurement results, the Ministry of the 
Interior had a computer-based radiation control 
system. The system performed the following 
tasks (Nieminen 1984):
• recording of data on nuclear explosions and 
radiation measurements, and transmitting 
them to all system users;
• defining the areas where warning or alarm is 
to be given to the public;
• compiling prognoses based on nuclear explo-
sion and wind data or on measuring data;
• follow-up of the radiation situation and its 
development; and
• transmitting information.
The data used in this review consists of the 
monitoring results from the Ministry of the Inte-
rior’s radiation monitoring network, which were 
stored in an unpublished database during the 
management of the consequences of the Cherno-
byl nuclear accident. In this review we present 
the radiation situation pictures produced in 1986 
and new analyses of the same data produced with 
new means in 2011. The main emphasis is on the 
quality of the situation pictures used in 1986.
The Chernobyl accident
Atmospheric transport
The Chernobyl nuclear accident took place in the 
former Soviet Union on 26 April 1986 at 01:23 
Local Time (LT) (IAEA 1992). Two explosions 
occurred in the accident (Arvela et al. 1987). The 
accident destroyed one of the four RBMK-1000 
type reactors and released significant radioactive 
contamination into the environment.
The first emissions were transported north-
westwards over Poland, the Baltic States, Fin-
land, Sweden and Norway. On 27 April 1986, 
emissions were spreading to eastern central 
Europe, southern Germany, Italy and former 
Yugoslavia. Within the next week, the plume 
was transported southwards from Chernobyl to 
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Romania, Bulgaria, the Balkans, the Black Sea 
and Turkey. After that, the emissions arrived 
again over central Europe and Scandinavia 
(Persson et al. 1987). Finally, the plume was dis-
tributed practically throughout the northern hem-
isphere. Most of the radioactivity that originated 
from Chernobyl remained in the troposphere, 
but it could be detected also in the stratosphere 
(Jaworowski and Kownacka 1988).
The calculated air mass trajectories originat-
ing from Chernobyl at the time of the accident 
show that the radioactive plume moved first 
northwestwards (Valkama et al. 1995). At the 
altitudes of 1500–2500 m, the plume continued 
to southwestern Finland and once over Finland 
the plume turned to northeast and continued over 
the Soviet Union to the White Sea. The arrival 
time in southwestern Finland for a release height 
of 2000 m was 27 April 1986 at 12:00 Coordi-
nated Universal Time (UTC). The plume was 
hindered by a frontal zone from the north and did 
not reach northern Finland (Paatero et al. 2010).
Precipitation efficiently scavenges airborne 
contaminants to the ground. Thus precipitation 
governed in many cases how the Chernobyl 
plume was deposited in Finland. On 27 April 
1986, when the first release plume from Cher-
nobyl passed over Finland there was no or very 
light rain in southern Finland (Paatero et al. 
2010). A slightly larger amount of precipitation 
(< 3 mm) occurred in a zone from southwestern 
Finland towards the northeast. On 28 April 1986, 
the weather in southern Finland was quite dry 
except that some rain was observed in the regions 
of Huittinen, Varkaus and Multia, and along the 
coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. During the next 
three days, there was heavy precipitation (up to 
10 mm per day) along a zone from the coast of 
the Gulf of Bothnia southeastwards towards the 
Kotka region. After that, there was a dryer period 
from 1 May 1986 (Finnish Centre for Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety 1986a, Finnish Centre for 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety 1986b, Nordlund 
1986, Savolainen et al. 1986, Arvela et al. 1987).
Management of the radiation situation in 
1986
The first official notification of the accident that 
was received from the Soviet Union’s official 
news office was released by the TV news of Fin-
land’s national public service broadcasting com-
pany (YLE) on Monday 28 April 1986 at 20:30 
LT. Before that, there were several observations 
of increased external dose rates in both Sweden 
and Finland. In Sweden, the observations were 
made at the Forsmark nuclear power plant. In 
Finland, the first observations were made in 
Kajaani on Sunday 27 April 1986 at 20:40 LT 
at a radiation monitoring station operated by 
the Defence Forces (STUK press release 28 
April 1986 16:00 LT). In addition some obser-
vations were made at other monitoring stations 
but those were not made available at that time 
to the decision makers. Later these recordings 
were restored and used in the situation analysis 
(Paatero et al. 2010).
When the Ministry of the Interior received 
the information regarding abnormal radiation 
monitoring results on 28 April 1986 at 14:30 LT, 
it contacted STUK, and some more information 
was exchanged. STUK reported about observa-
tions made in Sweden at the Forsmark nuclear 
power plant. The headquarters of the Finnish 
Defence Forces reported the above-mentioned 
Kajaani abnormal measurement to the Ministry 
of the Interior on 28 April shortly after 14:30 LT.
STUK requested the Ministry of the Interior 
to check the monitoring data at the external 
gamma radiation monitoring stations equipped 
with DPR-82 units, which was done on the same 
day at around 15:30 LT (Fig. 7). The dose rates 
at some stations in southern Finland were 1.5–2 
times higher than the normal dose rate of 0.05–
0.15 µSv h–1. This is not exceptional as the snow 
cover attenuates the gamma radiation emitted 
by the natural radionuclides in the ground and 
northern Finland was still covered with snow at 
the time of the Chernobyl accident (Fig. 8). At 
21:00 LT, the Ministry of the Interior ordered 
intensified monitoring at the monitoring stations 
equipped with DPR-82 units. The stations should 
log the monitoring result once every hour into a 
logbook and report the results on demand.
On Tuesday 29 April 1986, the measurement 
results from regions with precipitation showed 
5–30 times higher dose rate values than normal. 
The Ministry of the Interior ordered intensified 
monitoring at all continuously monitoring sta-
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tions. The monitoring results should be logged 
into a logbook at 7:00, 15:00 and 23:00 LT, and 
reported to the Ministry every morning at 9:00 
LT by fax or telex. The results of the intensified 
measurements were received for the first time 
soon after 15:00 LT on 29 April. The highest 
dose rate, 4 µSv h–1, was measured in Uusikau-
punki (Fig. 9).
The Ministry of the Interior and STUK 
decided to extend the intensified monitoring to 
all Ministry of the Interior monitoring stations 
from 2 May 1986 12:00 LT. The radiation moni-
toring data system developed for civil defence 
purposes was modified so as to enable the meas-
urement records to be stored in a database, and 
subsequently used to draw radiation maps with a 
data plotter. The first map was drawn on 2 May 
1986 at 12:12 LT (Fig. 10). The dose rates from 
external gamma radiation decreased gradually. 
The area with increased dose rates extended 
from southern Finland to the Kokkola–Kajaani 
line.
On 5 May 1986, the Ministry of the Interior 
prepared a composite radiation map for Finland. 
Increased dose rates were registered south from 
the Kokkola–Kajaani line. The values were about 
twice the normal values, but only at locations 
with heavy rain (e.g., Uusikaupunki [see Fig. 
11], Hämeenlinna, Lahti, Tampere, Jyväskylä, 
Rauma
Dose rates (µSv h–1) on
28 Apr. 1986 at 15:00 
0.2–0.35 (3)
0.15–0.2 (2)
0.09–0.15 (7)
Vammala
(currently Sastamala)
Forssa
Seinäjoki
Raahe
Kerava
Ylivieska
Pieksämäki
Heinola
Kajaani
0.33
0.19
0.24
0.12
0.11
0.12
0.09
0.15
0.13
0.2
0.1
0 0
0
Fig. 7. external gamma 
dose rates 28 april 1986 
after 15:00 lt (data from 
ministry of the interior).
Fig. 8. Depth of snow cover (cm) in Finland on 1 may 
1986 (data: Finnish meteorological institute).
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On 6 May 1986, the Ministry of the Interior 
changed the routine for intensified measurements 
Viitasaari), they were about 10 times higher than 
normal (Fig. 12).
Kerava Kotka
Rauma
Forssa
Uusikaupunki
Vammala
Heinola
Pieksämäki
Seinäjoki
Kokkola
Ylivieska
Raahe
Kajaani
0.23
0.14
0.92
0.14
3.8
0.54
0.8 0.12
0.21
0.48
0.17
0.1
Dose rates (µSv h–1) on
29 Apr. 1986 at 15:00
0.92–3.8
0.48–0.92
0.17–0.48
0.14-0.17
0.1–0.14
Fig. 9. external gamma 
dose rates on 29 apr. 1986 
at 15:00 lt. (data from 
ministry of the interior).
Fig. 10. external gamma dose rates on 2 may 1986 at 15:00 lt. (a) orginal map, and (b) the current mapinfo ver-
sion.
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at the continuously monitoring stations: hence-
forth, the data should be entered into the logbook 
once every three hours starting at 9:00 LT, and the 
results should be delivered to the Ministry  the 
following morning after 9:00 LT. The other sta-
tions should register the results once a day at 8:00 
LT, and deliver them to the state provincial offices 
immediately after each measurement. The offices 
should deliver the combined list of the results 
from their regions to the Ministry by telex or fax. 
However, upon a marked rise in dose rates, the 
Ministry should be notified immediately.
To establish the normal background external 
gamma radiation dose rate at each station, on 7 
May 1986 the Ministry of the Interior collected 
the 22 April and 29 April radiation data from 
the State provincial offices’ emergency response 
centres. On 17 May 1986, the Ministry ordered 
the monitoring at the stations back to normal 
routine.
Analysis of the monitoring data
Based on the monitoring results, the Ministry of 
the Interior compiled rough maps of the radia-
tion and presented them each day, usually in the 
early afternoon. The radiation monitoring data 
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Fig. 11. Dose rates in 
Uusi kaupunki (south-
western Finland), after 
the chernobyl accident in 
spring 1986.
Fig. 12. external gamma dose rates on 5 may 1986 at 15:00 lt. (a) orginal map, and (b) the current mapinfo ver-
sion.
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system plotted isocurves of the radiation dose 
rates. The grid for the calculation was based 
on the Triangulated Irregular Network (TIN) 
method. The interpolation of the results was 
done so that every station within a 50-km radius 
had an effect on the result calculated for the grid. 
The results were weighted with the distance. The 
values of the isocurves were were about 2, 5 and 
10 times the normal background dose rate level, 
i.e. 0.2, 0.5 and 1.0 µSv h–1, respectively.
We redrew the map of the dose rates with the 
MapInfo Professional 10.0 software. The used 
method was Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) 
(Shepard 1968). The IDW interpolator calculates 
the values of grid cells that cover the mapping 
area. Each data point value that is considered in 
the calculation for a cell value is weighted by 
its distance from the centre of the cell. Because 
the interpolation is an inverse distance weight-
ing calculation, the farther a point is from the 
cell, the less influence its value will have on the 
resulting cell value. According to the MapInfo 
user guide, this method of interpolation works 
well for sparse data and for arbitrary data. The 
used values were: grid size 10 km, exponent 5 
and radius 100 km. The exponent determines 
how much influence each point will have on 
the result. The higher the exponent the greater 
the influence closer points will have on the cell 
value.
The original radiation situation maps (Figs. 
10a and 12a) — also used by the decision 
makers and to inform the media — were plotted 
with a plotter and the raster was added manually. 
The new maps (Figs. 10b and 12b) were based 
on those maps. Because of the different interpo-
lation method, smaller anomalies are shown on 
the new maps, and the resolution of the results 
is better. However, the resolution of the maps in 
1986 was good enough for identification of the 
most contaminated areas.
In the original maps, the missing values for 
stations were extra- and interpolated. For the 
extrapolation the modified Way-Wigner formula 
(Way and Wigner 1948) was used for the fallout:
 D
t
 = D
ref
t –0.9 (4)
where D
t
 is the dose rate at time t (in hours) and 
D
ref
 is the reference dose rate (here 298 µSv h–1). 
The exponent (–0.9) was calculated from the 
Uusikaupunki measurement results, and it was 
used for all stations.
When comparing the map of the original 
gamma radiation two weeks after the accident 
with the caesium deposition map created by 
STUK in 1986–1987 based on sensitive Geiger 
counter and mobile gamma spectrometer meas-
urements (from Arvela et al. 1990), similarities 
are evident (see Fig. 13; the lines have been 
drawn to help comparisons). Linear correlations 
between dose rates calculated from caesium 
deposition and external dose rate rise caused 
by the deposition were also calculated for three 
regional levels: 12 provincial office regions r 
= 0.98, 21 counties r = 0.77 (Fig. 14); and 209 
municipalities r = 0.66. There are some differ-
ences in low dose rates, which can be explained 
by differences in accuracy of the monitoring 
instruments and the reference time. The Ministry 
of the Interior’s monitoring network results are 
from the 16th day after the accident, and they 
include also gamma radiation from short-lived 
gamma-emitting isotopes. In the comparison 
map (Fig. 13a), only gamma radiation emitted 
from 137Cs and 134Cs is shown.
After the peak of external radiation — 4 
µSv h–1 in Uusikaupunki on 29 April 1986 at 
20:00 LT (Fig. 11) — the dose rate started to 
decrease with a half-life of 4.8 days (Paatero et 
al. 2010). This suggests that much of the external 
radiation was due to 131I (half-life 8.0 days) and 
132Te/132I. The half-lives of 132Te and 132I are 3.2 
days and 2.3 hours, respectively.
When the external dose rate is plotted against 
the 131I deposition in southern Finland reported 
by Jantunen et al. (1987) (see Fig. 15), the points 
are scattered, and no correlation exists (r2 = 
0.1229). This can be related to the poor quality 
of the measurements, or the distance between the 
dose rate monitoring points and the 131I deposi-
tion measurement sites. The deposition was very 
unevenly distributed even within a few kilome-
tres especially in southwestern Finland (Raune-
maa et al. 1987). There can also be human errors 
involved because many measurements as well as 
data transfer and processing was done manually. 
Due to the 131I deposition of about 75 kBq m–2, 
the measured dose rates approached or exceeded 
0.4 µSv h–1 in every case but one.
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Cs dose rate (µSv h–1)
from Arvela et al. (1990)
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Fig. 14. correlation 
between between exter-
nal dose rates on 15 may 
1986 minus each station’s 
background level on 22 
april 1986, and dose rates 
calculated from cs depo-
sition (arvela et al. 1990) 
for the counties.
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Fig. 13. (a) Dose rates calculated from arvela et al. (1990), and (b) differences between external dose rates on 15 
may 1986 and station’s background levels on 22 april 1986. the lines have been drawn to help comparisons.
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Fig. 15. Dose rate on 3 may 1986 vs. 131i deposition in southern and central Finland (data from Jantunen et al. 
1987). the dashed line indicates the theoretical dose rate of 0.0013 µsv h–1 due to the 131i deposition only (health 
canada 1999), and the dotted line the dose rate of 0.4 µsv h–1, i.e., the current inter-agency warning level.
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The external gamma radiation monitoring 
network was useful in the initial management 
of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. 
The first three weeks after the accident, higher 
external dose rates were detected by the monitor-
ing network. After two months, the dose rates 
decreased to levels difficult to detect. The rea-
sons for that were the decay of the radioactive 
deposition, the washout of deposition from the 
ground surface, and the vertical migration of 
deposition to the ground. The partial snow cov-
erage and frozen ground in Finland in early May 
1986 may also have caused a more rapid transfer 
of deposited radionuclides from the ground sur-
face to water systems, and subsequently into the 
Baltic Sea.
Discussion and conclusions
In most cases a dense network of gamma radia-
tion monitoring stations will satisfy the require-
ment of detecting serious threats from a radioac-
tive plume. A simple Geiger counter can be used 
for radiation mapping if dose rates are within 
the detection range of the counter. When count-
ing the pulses manually (audible or light pulses) 
from the GM tube, the overall accuracy is ±50%. 
Studies after the Chernobyl accident showed that 
the alarm level with a digital counter could be 
set to 0.4 µSv h–1 with a 1-hour counting time, 
but with a 3-minute counting time the alarm 
level should be 1 µSv h–1. Correlation show that 
the measurements correlate better within larger 
areas.
This review shows that a quite simple sta-
tionary external gamma radiation monitoring 
network can provide reliable radiation mapping 
after a release from a nuclear power plant. The 
requirements for such a network should be:
1. The measurement range for the monitoring 
instruments should detect significant changes 
in external gamma radiation: a ±30% change 
in background radiation must be detected.
2. The network grid density determines the res-
olution of the radiation mapping. The denser 
the grid the better the resolution. At least one 
monitoring station should be in each grid 
cell.
3. The location and time of the measurement 
must be recorded.
4. The measuring procedure should be stand-
ardized for all stations. The measurement 
time, height from ground level and the free 
area around the detector should be standard 
for all recorded results.
For early warning purposes there are addi-
tional requirements:
1. To minimize false alarms, there should be a 
predefined, customized alarm level for each 
station: a level that is generated from earlier 
recorded results at the station and depends on 
the measurement capabilities of the station.
2. The alarm and measurement must be con-
firmed by independent means. There should 
be a local operator measure the surroundings 
of the detector.
3. The alarm should be delivered to on duty per-
sonnel automatically.
To study and analyze the measurements there 
are further requirements:
1. The meteorological data should be available. 
The minimum needed are the existence of 
precipitation at the station and the prevailing 
wind speed and direction.
2. There should be data processing capacity so 
that the data can be presented in an easy-to-
understand visual format.
These requirements are well met in the cur-
rent Finnish inter-agency radiation monitoring 
and analysis system called USVA (Devell and 
Lauritzen 2001), which has been in operation 
since the year 1999.
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